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THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND ANTITRUST POLICY:
A TIME FOR REAPPRAISAL
PHILIP ELMAN*
What has been learned from thirty years' enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act? To answer that question Federal Trade
Commissioner Elman calls for an objective and thorough study and
reappraisal of the act in relation to basic antitrust goals and policy.
The fundamental question is how a price discrimination law can
operate to help attain the broader antitrust goals of achieving eco-
nomic growth and progress while preserving and enlarging economic
opportunity. Commissioner Elman points out the major problem
areas which should be the subject of such a study, among them
standards of competitive injury, cost justification, and the meeting
competition defense. He suggests that the most critical question,
whose solution may obviate many of the problems, is how to re-
orient enforcement policy to focus on the central evil at which the
Robinson-Patman Act was aimed-the misuse of large buying
power.
I. CALLS FOR REAPPRAISAL
During the thirty years since its enactment in 1936, the Robinson-
Patman Act has been a subject of continuing controversy and concern.
Fundamental questions about the act and its administration remain
without satisfactory answers. Is there a basic conflict between the
provisions of the act and a broader national antitrust policy? Is there
an internal disharmony and confusion of policy goals within the act
itself? Has the act suffered from weakness or inadequacy in enforce-
ment? The act was primarily aimed at the exaction by large and
powerful buyers of discriminatory price concessions not available to
their smaller competitors. To what extent has the act succeeded or
failed in achieving that objective? On balance, has the act helped more
than hurt competition? In the light of thirty years' experience and the
results obtained under it, should the provisions of the act and its
present mode of administration be left intact? Or does sound antitrust
policy require that changes be made-and, if so, what kinds of
changes?
*Federal Trade Commissioner
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A call for review and reappraisal of the Robinson-Patman Act and
its administration has recently come from a most respected source:
the National Commission on Food Marketing. In the final report
which it submitted in June 1966 to the President and the Congress, the
Commission stated:'
Price discrimination continues to be a threat in the food industry to fair
competition among buyers, and in some cases among sellers.... While
the Robinson-Patman Act is widely viewed in the food industry as an
important and necessary statute, it has shortcomings which endanger its
effectiveness.... Concepts of competitive injury should be kept abreast of
changing business practices, and the enforcement agencies should avoid
routine use of statutes without regard to the significance of discrimi-
nation.
We conclude, therefore, that a study and reappraisal of the Robinson-
Patnman Act and its administration is now appropriate, in order to
determine needed revisions in light of current economic conditions and
overall antitrust policies.
This conclusion was also shared by the minority members, who stated:2
"We are pleased to agree. The Robinson-Patman Act and other anti-
trust laws do need early 'study and reappraisal' to determine their
responsiveness to national needs."
The Supreme Court, in the Automatic Canteen case,3 emphasized
the need "to reconcile [the Robinson-Patman Act] ... with the
broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress." The
Court has also recognized, however, that the task of achieving such
reconciliation is too large to be borne solely by the judiciary.4 The
time has come, I submit, for the Federal Trade Commission to heed
the strong and insistent pleas, which have come not only from the
courts but from distinguished lawyers and economists,' for a search-
ing reexamination of the Robinson-Patman Act and its administration.
From the standpoint of private practitioners engaged in preventive
antitrust counselling, the problems involved in reconciling the require-
ments of the Robinson-Patman Act with those of the Sherman Act
1 NAT'L COMMON FOOD MARKETING REP. 107 (June 1966). (Italics in original.)
Id. at 130.
'Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
'FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 177 (1960); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAW 627-57 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
EDWARDS]; ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATIIAN ACT ix-xiii(1963) [hereinafter cited as RowE] ; Austern, Isn't Thirty Years Enough, 30 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 18 (1966); Rowe, The Robinson-Patinan Act-Thirty K'ars
Thereafter, 30 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 9 (1966).
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are serious and pressing. In a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review,
an anonymous critic-who described himself only as "an aged and old-
fashioned antitrust lawyer and law professor who still believes with
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes that the Sherman Act is 'a charter of free-
dom' "--stated that lawyers "compare their job in advising under
[the Robinson-Patman Act] to the stability of a dog walking on his
hind legs. Other lawyers say it is difficult to explain without using
both hands, and often having to remove one shoe, because each new
decision creates 'a new snake pit' of unsettled problems."'7
As the Supreme Court stated in Socony-Vacuum,s price fixing
threatens "the central nervous system of the economy." Businessmen
who must operate in the pressures of the marketplace should not be
forced to make pricing decisions at their peril. The legal standards
which must be observed by businessmen in making pricing decisions in
the day-to-day conduct of their business should be reasonable, realistic,
and easily understood. Respect for law is not promoted if lawyers
called upon to give advice in such matters have to throw up their
hands in confusion or despair. If a businessman is advised that he can
protect himself against a charge of violating the Robinson-Patman
Act only by engaging in conduct which may subject him to prosecution
under the Sherman Act, he is not the only one that suffers. The public
is also the loser.
The goal of antitrust is compendiously expressed in a single word:
competition. As the Supreme Court has stated, "competition is our
fundamental national economic policy."9 If, as many charge, the
Robinson-Patman Act as administered serves mainly as an obstacle to
effective competition, it is surely a matter of concern. And if, as others
charge, the act has failed to prevent large buyers from obtaining unfair
price discriminations which may injure or destroy competition, it is no
less cause for concern. To be sure, the concept of "competition" em-
braces many and varied objectives. It is a means, however imperfect,
of regulating markets and allocating resources in the most efficient way.
It is a means for maximizing consumer satisfactions. It is also a means
for achieving economic growth and progress, and for preserving and
enlarging economic opportunity. How may a price discrimination law
operate to help attain these goals? That is the fundamental question.
079 HRV. L. REv. 921 (1966).
7 Id. at 922.
'United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59, at 226 (1940).
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
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And the answer, in all of its aspects, will come only after the Robinson-
Patman Act and its administration are reexamined in the light of the
national antitrust policy favoring competition.
Such a study should be a function of the agency which Congress has
charged with primary responsibility for enforcing the act: the Federal
Trade Commission. After thirty years of stewardship of the act, the
Commission should render an accounting to the Congress and the
public. It should take inventory of the successes or failure of the
Robinson-Patman Act, measured by past and current experience.
What is needed is a comprehensive and objective overview in which
the forest is not obscured by the trees.
Any such study would involve the full commitment of the resources
of the Commission and its staff. But it is also necessary that such a
study, and the recommendations based upon it, be entirely free from
any suggestion of institutional bias or predisposition. The answers to
the difficult and serious questions that have been raised about the act
will not spring full-blown from those of us who are immersed in the
day-to-day chores of administration and adjudication of specific cases.
If the study is to be of value-if it is to be influential in bringing about
change where change is needed-it must merit respect for its imparti-
ality and objectivity. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate that the
study, at least in its initial phase, be conducted by a special task force
consisting of leading economic and legal scholars in the fields of anti-
trust and industrial organization, who would have the full cooperation,
as well as access to the resources and investigatory powers of the
Commission. Perhaps the type of task force used by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in its recent mutual fund and securities
markets studies could be used as a model. At all events, I think it
imperative that the Commission begin now the planning and organiza-
tion of a full-scale review and reappraisal of the Robinson-Patman
Act and its administration.
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS
Despite the criticisms that have been made of the Robinson-Patman
Act and its administration, there should be none as to the validity of
the underlying premise on which Congress acted in passing the law.
The act expressed a basic consensus that business rivalry in a free
economy should not be unfair and destructive of the competitive proc-
ess. It was premised, in part at least, on a recognition that there will
always be large buyers who may attempt to abuse their power to the
[ VOL. 42: 1
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detriment not only of their smaller and weaker rivals but of the process
of competition.
It could be said that the act was intended to limit competition among
sellers, in the short run, in the hope of strengthening competition
among buyers, in the long run. The "guiding ideal" of Congress in
passing the law was "the preservation of equality of opportunity as
far as possible to all who are usefully employed in the service of dis-
tribution and production."" As the Supreme Court stated in the
Sun Oil case," "Congress intended to assure, to the extent reasonably
practicable, that businessmen at the same functional level would start
on equal competitive footing so far as price is concerned." Given an
imperfect world, such a design involves no necessary inconsistency
with basic antitrust policy, since the "competition" sought to be limited
is unfair rivalry among unequals, a type of conduct that may lead to
monopoly. Thus, the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act is rooted in
a justifiable ethic: that it is unfair to competitors and injurious to
competition for large buyers to use their power to exact discriminatory
price concessions not available to smaller and weaker rivals.
From its very inception, however, the act and its administration have
fallen under criticism and attack on all sides. Some of the assaults have
indeed been extreme and unfair. The one that takes the prize is the
indefensible charge that the sentiments giving rise to the act were
"reminiscent of the beginnings of the Nazi movement in Germany,
where the same zeal was displayed to protect the small businessman
from his large competitors."' 2 I shall not repeat other criticisms, which
have been collected elsewhere, 13 except to note that the obscurities and
inconsistencies of the act's language have invariably evoked unflatter-
ing comment. Mr. Justice Harlan was not alone in his recent reference
to the act as "singularly opaque.' 14 What I shall attempt here, rather,
is to outline some of the basic questions of antitrust policy which have
emerged from thirty years' enforcement of the act. These questions
furnish a departure point for the study and reappraisal which is
needed.
Criticism of the act has come mainly from two directions. On the
one hand, it is said that the act "tends to be a price-fixing statute
'" H.R. REP'. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
"FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963).
12 Quoted in Levi, The Robinson-Patnan Act-Is It in the Public Interest?,
I ABA ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 60 (1952).
"179 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1966) ; RowE 535 n.4 and Supp. (1964), at 168.
"FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (separate memorandum).
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hiding in the clothes of anti-monopoly and pro-competition symbols."'
The argument here is that by emphasizing price uniformity, the act
has in effect required the kind of price rigidity which the Sherman Act
condemns. Indeed, Professor Adelman has argued that by focusing on
discrimination as a price difference, the act is in direct conflict with the
economic concept of discrimination and has resulted in the kind of
misallocation of resources which characterizes a monopolistic, rather
than a competitive, economy. 6
Economic discrimination is not measured by differences in price
alone; it can occur when prices are identical to all buyers. In economic
terms, a discrimination is the receipt by a seller of different net re-
turns on sales to different buyers. Thus, if X's costs of selling to
buyer A are significantly lower than selling to buyer B, but X charges
the same price to both, a serious economic discrimination has been
effected against buyer A even though there has been no price discrimin-
ation.
In a competitive economy, Professor Adelman points out, "there
would be a strong tendency for the sellers to bid this higher-margin
business away from each other, forcing down the margin toward
equality with the other customers."'1 7 It is by this process in a com-
petitive economy that resources are channeled to the most efficient
methods of doing business and prices are reduced. A law which, in the
guise of preventing price discrimination, limits the reduction of prices
that eliminate economic discrimination blocks the proper functioning
of the competitive process. The consequence will be that efficiency is
not rewarded and prices remain rigidly high. In short, it is asserted,
a law which unduly discourages price differences to different customers
throws the competitive system out of gear. In the view of many, this
has been the actual effect of the Robinson-Patman Act.
On the other hand, many have argued that the act has failed in its
primary objective-to prevent large buyers from gaining decisive ad-
vantages over their competitors through the exaction of economically
unjustified price concessions. Such criticism has been aimed, in part,
at allegedly misguided Commission enforcement policies. It has been
contended that the impact of Commission enforcement has fallen
mainly on small sellers rather than big buyers, and that it has con-
" Levi, supra note 12, at 61.
"Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 223-27 (1955); see also Schniderman, The Impact of the
Robinson-Patman Act on Pricing Flexibility, 57 Nw. U.L. R~v. 173 (1962).
" Adelman, supra note 16, at 234.
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cerned itself too much with the insignificant or trivial."8 But the
criticisms in this regard have also been directed at the act itself.
Despite the concern with the exercise of large buying power which
motivated its enactment, the central focus of the act as written is upon
the conduct of the seller. It has also been pointed out, and this is a
matter which I will come back to, that the good faith defense-which
enables sellers to meet the equally low price of their competitors-
contains a built-in provision which is favorable to large buyers and
increases the likelihood of their obtaining discriminatory price advan-
tages over small competitors.' Some question has also arisen as to
whether section 2 (f), the section directed at buyers, imposes too heavy
a burden of investigation and proof upon the Commission, thereby
discouraging attempts to enforce the law against large and powerful
buyers.
Finally, there is a variety of ways in which a large buyer can avoid
the act altogether. A discriminatory price to a large buyer which can
be cost-justified is entirely outside the prohibitions of the act. In addi-
tion, a large buyer can get around the act by taking a seller's entire
output at a very low price not available to others. Professor Edwards
recently concluded that both camps of critics-those who criticized the
act's anticompetitive tendencies and those who criticized its failure to
curb the anticompetitive abuses of buying power-were essentially
correct. On the one hand, he pointed out that:2 °
Discrimination that damages competition has been hard to distinguish
from competition that merely recognizes and reacts to the varying
intensity of competition in imperfect markets. For this reason, the law
has handicapped sellers in responding flexibly to varying circumstances
and has given rise to enduring controversy about the proper limits of the
right to discriminate in order to meet competition. Discrimination that
is an incident in the process by which price changes spread has been hard
to distinguish from discrimination that creates enduring competitive
advantages. For this reason the law has created hazards for those who
try to drive hard bargains. Discrimination sometimes produces mixed
effects, enhancing competition among oligopolistic sellers while diminish-
ing it among their customers. Under such circumstances, the law con-
demns the diminution and ignores the enhancement. Because of the
law's inherent ambiguities, businessmen can now vary their selling prices
or haggle over buying prices only with caution and under legal guidance.
" EDWARDS 624-28; RowE 53943; Note, Small Bushiess Before the Federal
Trade Commz)nissio, 75 YAr.E L.J. 487 (1966).
"' EDWARDS 569-71, 580-83.
'Edwards, Control of the Single Firm: Its Place in Antitrust Policy, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 465, 476-77 (1965).
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Whether, on balance, the law has maintained more competition than it
has impaired is uncertain.
On the other hand, after enumerating the ways in which a large buyer
can avoid the restrictions of the Robinson-Patman Act, he concluded
that: 2'
[the act] has been a weak instrument with which to prevent whatever
concentration of economic power may result from discrimination. Its
principal achievements have been equitable-diminution of various
inequalities in the terms of trade available to weak distributors. The
degree of this achievement has tended to be greatest in eliminating
discriminations that were not very important to corporate empire-
builders.
The source and extent of these criticisms surely demonstrate the
need for taking a good long look at how the Robinson-Patman Act is
actually working out. Even the severest critics of the act seem to agree
that price discrimination could be used as a potent weapon for the
destruction of competition, although some doubt has been expressed as
to the extent it has actually been used for that purpose in the past.
22
Theoretically at least, a powerful national seller might, out of monop-
oly profits derived in some markets, subsidize a selective use of lower
prices in other markets in order to eliminate or discipline competitors
in those markets. Our early antitrust history reflects the belief that
such price discriminations were used for predatory purposes by the
great trusts. 3 A large buyer might also exploit its power to obtain
substantial and significant price concessions enabling it to eliminate or
discipline competitors. The belief that such practices were in fact
being used by large chains to impair competition in the retail food in-
dustry was the premise on which the Robinson-Patman Act was en-
acted. 4
I think we could all agree that a price discrimination law aimed at
practices so destructive to competition is fully consistent with, and
complementary to, the goals of our antitrust laws. At the same time,
we could also agree that all differences in price cannot be condemned
Id. at 477.
See Adelman, supra note 16, at 232-33; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:
The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAw & EcoN. 137 (1958); McGee, Some
Economic Issues in Robhnw-Patman Land, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 530, 546-48(1965).
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
' See Federal Trade Commission Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation,
S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
[ VOL. 42 : 1
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
as anticompetitive. First, differences in price which reflect the passing
on to a buyer, in the form of lower prices, of savings flowing from its
more efficient methods of doing business are essential to the main-
tenance of a competitive system. Such lower prices are rewards to the
efficient; their elimination would remove or lessen the incentive for
increasing efficiency and reducing ultimate costs to the consumer.
Second, price differences will naturally arise from the ordinary pres-
sures of everyday bargaining and haggling in a competitive market.
A price discrimination law which results in the elimination of such
pressures would impair or obstruct the competitive process. Especially
in a sellers' market that is oligopolistically structured, the ability of a
few buyers to obtain lower prices may be the only way in which a
general reduction of prices in such a market can come about." In
short, there is a compelling need to distinguish between those dis-
criminations in price which may injure competition and those which
reflect active and vigorous pressures of competition and which are a
necessary concomitant of a healthy competitive system.
Against the background of these general observations and criticisms
that have been made concerning the act, I should like to turn to some
specific problems which reflect the major areas of tension and conflict
between antitrust goals and the price discrimination law.
III. STANDARDS OF COM!PETITIVE INJURY IN PRICE
DIScRImINATIONs
While price discrimination within the meaning of the act is "merely
a price difference,""0 the central prohibition of the act makes unlawful
only those discriminations in price between purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality whose effect may be (a) "substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly," or which (b) "injure,
destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the
customers of either of them." The first standard is a familiar Clayton
Act standard; the second is a novel definition of injury which was
added by the Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act.
At the secondary line of competition-that is, the buyer's level-a
very narrow concept of competitive injury has prevailed. Essentially,
'AT"Y GEN. NAT'L COM . ANTITRUST REP. 336 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; see DIRLAN & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 204 (1954) ; ROwE 25-28.
' FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
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any price difference which is substantial in relation to industry profit
margins is likely to be held sufficient to establish the competitive
injury required by the act." There are clear indications that mechan-
ical and dogmatic applications of this standard will not go unchallenged
in the courts. In the Sun Oil case, for example, the Supreme Court
admonished that "in appraising the effects of any price cut ... both the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts must make realistic ap-
praisals of relevant competitive facts. Invocation of mechanical word
formulas cannot be made to substitute for adequate probative analy-
sis. ..."28 But such judicial expressions do not appear as yet to have
had significant impact on the decisional standards applied by the
Commission. 9
The application of this formula at the secondary line raises two im-
portant questions: The first relates to a so-called "pure" secondary-
line case involving the legality of a price difference extended to buyers
who function and compete only at a single level of distribution. The
other relates to the so-called functional discount paid to a vertically
integrated buyer who operates at two or more levels of distribution
and who competes with unintegrated buyers who sell only at the lower
level of distribution.
In the "pure" secondary-line case, the problems of defining injury to
competition may not appear at first glance to be important. Where a
price concession gives one buyer a substantial price advantage over
another, one may ask whether further inquiry is necessary to ascertain
if competition in any broad market sense has been injured. I think the
question is worth asking and deserves answer. First, the assumption
that the cost justification proviso adequately assures buyers the re-
wards of efficiency must be critically appraised. If it does not, and if
it is not feasible to construct a workable cost justification proviso,
the definition of competitive injury at the secondary line would assume
greater significance. A more pliable definition, permitting greater flex-
ibility in pricing, would tend to assure that a price discrimination law
does not promote economic discriminations-creating undue unifor-
mity in the face of differing degrees of efficiency." I will presently
examine the question of the adequacy of the cost justification proviso.
' FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
'FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527 (1962); see also American Oil Co. v.
FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1963).
See, e.g., Alhambra Motor Parts, No. 6889, FTC, Dec. 17, 1965.
" See McGee, Some Economic Issues in Robinso;,-Patman Land, 30 LAW &
CoNxTEmp. PRoB. 530, 542 (1965).
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For the moment, I merely wish to indicate the relationship of that
question to the determination of the appropriate standards of com-
petitive injury.
There is additional reason for policy concern about the narrow defi-
nition of competitive injury in a so-called "pure" secondary-line case.
It cannot be too often stressed that a price discrimination cannot be
looked upon solely in terms of its effect at the secondary line. A dif-
ference in price might confer some transient advantage upon a favored
buyer and yet at the same time reflect healthy and vigorous competi-
tion at the seller level-the so-called primary line-or the initiation of
a much needed price break at the seller level. Moreover, temporary
and shifting price discriminations, even of a substantial nature, are
not necessarily injurious to competition but may reflect instead the kind
of bargaining and haggling which is an essential part of the competitive
process. In competitive markets some buyers may obtain a price ad-
vantage on one item while others obtain a counter-balancing advantage
on another. Where there is no central pattern in these discrimina-
tions, where they are temporary or sporadic, or where they tend to
cancel each other out, they are not likely to produce any harmful effect
upon the competitive process. To the contrary, they merely reflect
varying pressures within a vigorous and healthy competitive market.
An inflexible or doctrinaire definition of competitive injury prohibiting
price differentials in such circumstances would dampen competitive
vigor. It would create too onerous a peril both to the exercise by
buyers of the "sturdy bargaining" which a competitive system en-
courages and to competitive responses by sellers to differing and chang-
ing pressures within the market.3
A perhaps more pressing question raised by the standards of com-
petitive injury applied at present under the Robinson-Patman Act
relates to the treatment of functional discounts-price concessions
intended to compensate for the performance of distribution functions-
given to integrated buyers competing at more than one level of the
distribution process. Ordinarily, sellers competing at different func-
tional levels in the distribution system do not compete with one
another. As a consequence, a lower price to a competitor at a higher
functional level in the distribution system could not injure competition.
For example, wholesalers ordinarily receive a lower price than re-
tailers; no one is concerned that this raises a problem under the
EDiwARs 540-44, 638-43.
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Robinson-Patman Act. 2  Vertical integration, however, does create
problems. Where the same firm competes at two separate levels of
distribution, it will find itself in direct competition with unintegrated
sellers competing only at the lower level. The Commission has tra-
ditionally treated such an integrated distributor as if it competed at
the lower functional level only, and has consistently and mechanically
applied the Morton Salt formula for determining injury in secondary
line cases.33 It has wholly ignored the fact that these integrated firms
compete at a higher level as well and that the effect of applying such
a simplistic definition of competitive injury may be to prevent the in-
tegrated firm from competing at the higher level. As some critics
have observed, by imposing a serious risk of law violation upon the
charging of lower prices designed to induce and compensate the per-
formance of additional distribution functions, the act tends to dis-
courage experimentation with new systems of marketing which may
eliminate or by-pass traditional avenues of distribution and thus may
contribute to marketing efficiency and to the overall enhancement of
competition. 34
I find nothing in the Robinson-Patman Act which indicates that it
was intended to prevent a manufacturer from obtaining distribution
through as many functionally distinct channels as his business needs
require. A legitimate functional price discount is the incentive which
a manufacturer offers his distributors to induce them to render dis-
tribution services which he may regard as necessary to increase effi-
ciency, lower costs, or expand consumer demand for his products.
A thorough reevaluation of the narrow standards of competitive in-
jury applied in this area is vitally needed. As I recently pointed out,
"competition, in the antitrust sense, may be truly injured by a policy
of law enforcement which preserves intact an inefficient, uneconomical
and stratified system of distribution, and prevents the elimination of
unnecessary middleman costs .... .""
'"But see Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946),
modified, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951);
Rowe 193-205.
'See, e.g., Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(petition for cert. pending); National Parts Warehouse, No. 8039, FTC, Dec. 16,
1963, aff'd sub nora. General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.
1965); Monroe Auto Equip. Co., No. 8543, FTC, July 29, 1964, aff'd sub nonz. CA.
Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1009 (1966) ; Alhambra Motor Parts, No. 6889, FTC, Dec. 17, 1965 (appeal pending
in Ninth Circuit).
" DIRLAN & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND EcoNomics OF ANTITRUTST
POLICY 132-33 (1954) ; EDWARDS 344-47; see ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 207-09.
'Alhambra Motor Parts, No. 6889, FTC, Dec. 17, 1965 (dissenting opinion).
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There is a third area in which a reappraisal of standards of com-
petitive injury is urgently needed-"area price discriminations."
Firms operating in a number of geographic markets often charge dif-
ferent prices in different markets depending on the local conditions.
Such pricing may be essential to, and promote, competition in local
markets; an overbroad restriction of area price differences could seri-
ously impair competition.
In a local market dominated by a few firms, the entry of a national
seller prepared to lower its price in order to secure a foothold in the
market may be the only cure for a rigid price structure characteristic
of oligopoly. Such a national seller may be unwilling to lower its price
in such a local market if it is required to make the same price reduc-
tion in all the other geographic markets in which it does business.
Selective local price cutting may also be a necessary first step in a
general lowering of prices. A national seller, reluctant to initiate a
uniform and general price reduction, might want to experiment with a
price reduction in one or several local markets before establishing it
throughout its entire marketing area. In general, a lack of uniformity
in the prices of a national seller, competing in many geographic mar-
kets, may simply reflect the seller's flexibility in adjusting price to
meet different competitive conditions in different markets. Insistence
on price uniformity in such situations could lead to high, rigid prices
and thereby hurt competition seriously.
On the other hand, selective local price cutting by national firms
possessing monopoly power in other markets could be used as a weapon
to eliminate or discipline competitors. The line between area price
discrimination which is predatory or destructive of competition and
that which promotes or expands competition is obviously difficult to
draw. But one thing is certain: it cannot be drawn merely at the
point where a price reduction diverts trade from a competitor. "[Sluc-
cessful competition necessarily diverts business from rivals. To make
such diversion unlawful is tantamount to a complete prohibition of the
tactics of making price reductions or price increases that result in
nonuniform prices.""0 It is a natural consequence of competition that
some competitors will lose business and some will even fall by the
wayside.
It should be clear, therefore, that a simple test of whether a price
reduction results in a diversion of business cannot suffice for deter-
"EDWARDS 637.
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mining injury to competition among sellers."7 The Federal Trade
Commission seems to have begun to move away from any such per se
approach to area price discrimination. 8 Unfortunately, current de-
cisions do not as yet reflect sufficient sensitivity to the difficult problem
of drawing a line between area price discrimination which impairs the
competitive process and that which promotes and fosters vigorous com-
petition at the primary line. 9 With no clear guide as to whether a
particular local price reduction is likely to be adjudged injurious to
competition, sellers must proceed at their own risk. An atmosphere of
such peril can only inhibit normal competitive responses and injure
the process of competition. Area price discrimination is, therefore, a
prime subject with which a reappraisal of the statute should be con-
cerned.
IV. COST JUSTIFICATION
As the legislative history of the act shows, Congress sought to assure
that the prohibition of price discrimination would not prevent the
development of efficient distribution methods or deprive buyers of the
rewards of lower prices which are the incentives for seeking more
efficient methods. For that purpose, Congress included the cost justi-
fication proviso.40 Nevertheless, opinion is almost unanimous that the
cost justification proviso has not fulfilled its function and is practically
useless to businessmen, accountants and lawyers." As the Supreme
Court noted, "proof of a cost justification being what it is, too often
no one can ascertain whether a price is cost-justified.) 42
The cost justification proviso as currently enforced has been criti-
cized on a variety of grounds. Some have suggested that the cost
' See, e.g., Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961); FTC Policy Toward Geographic
Pricing Practices, 1 TRADE REG. REP. 5341, 5348 (Oct. 12 ,1948).
Dean Milk Co., No. 8032, FTC, Oct. 22, 1965; Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., No.
7908, FTC, July 23, 1965; Forster Mfg. Co., No. 7207, FTC, July 23, 1965.
' Dean Milk Co., supra note 38.
" Remarks of Rep. Utterback, 80 CONG. REc. 9417 (1936):
The bill assures to the mass distributor, as to everyone else, full protection in
the use and rewards of efficient methods in production and distribution....
There is no limit to the phases of production, sale, and distribution in which
such improvements may be devised and the economies of superior efficiency
achieved, nor from which those economies, when demonstrated, may be ex-
pressed in price differentials in favor of the particular customers whose distinctive
methods of purchase and delivery make them possible.
See also H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936) ; S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936).
" See, e.g., Fennelly, On the Judging of Mince Pies, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1964, p. 77.
"Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
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factors which it permits to be shown are too limited and that recogni-
tion is not given to legitimate efficiencies and savings resulting from
sales to large buyers, such as efficiencies which result from the greater
utilization of plant capacity.43 The main criticism, however, has been
that the failure to develop realistic and clear standards for the deter-
mination of cost savings has made it impossible for businessmen or
their accountants to make practical use of the cost justification de-
fense in determining pricing policies.
The difficulties confronting a firm seeking to establish a cost justifi-
cation are many: it must establish that the classes of customers to
whom different prices are charged are sufficiently homogeneous with
respect to the methods and nature of their buying practices, and it
must then make an appropriate allocation of costs to the particular
classes. As has been pointed out, ordinarily "a firm's expenditures
comprising the differences in cost as between alternative methods of
distribution are typically spread among numerous products in varying
ways; the breakdown of these 'joint' costs among several components
involves largely subjective business judgments in choosing among sev-
eral equally rational alternative methods of allocation." 4 Accordingly,
it has been recognized that these elements are "not suitable for periodic
entry in a seller's regular books of account,"'46 and that the data nec-
essary for a Robinson-Patman cost defense cannot be obtained from
ordinary business records.46
There have been repeated calls for clearer guidelines which would
enable businessmen to make adequate use of the cost justification de-
fense, as well as recommendations that there be greater flexibility in
determining the adequacy of a cost defense. A 1956 study of the cost
justification proviso, made at the request of the Commission, urged
broader interpretation, greater acceptance of sampling procedures,
more leniency for cases in which anticipated costs turned out differ-
ently from actual costs because of circumstances beyond the control
of the seller, and wider acceptance of approximate cost justifications.
But that study failed to come up with adequate specific criticisms or
suggestions for improvements of the cost defense which would make it
more available and better able to serve its essential function of pro-
moting and preserving efficiencies in the distribution process.47 A re-
EDwARDs 613-15; McGee, supra note 22, at 538-42.
"ATroRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 174.
'5Ibid.
,9Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953).
"EDWARDS 608-16; TAGGART, COST JUSTIFrCATION 543-49 (1959).
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appraisal of the act would therefore necessarily include a thorough re-
examination of the cost justification proviso and its role as a means of
assuring that the price discrimination law does not penalize or dis-
courage the development of efficient methods of distribution and that
it does not function, as some have charged, as a method of perpetuating
economic discrimination.4"
V. MEETING COMPETITION DEFENSE
No issue has produced more serious collisions between antitrust policy
and the Robinson-Patman Act than the determination of the scope and
availability of the meeting competition defense. Professor Edwards
has said that the good faith defense has been "criticized as too narrow
and as too broad, as insufficient and excessive, and as a curb on com-
petition both in its narrowness and its breadth. These apparently
contradictory sets of appraisals are both substantially correct."' 9 The
conflict between antitrust policy and a law aimed at curbing excessive
buying power which may be used to impair competition at the buyer's
level is readily perceived in this context. Sound antitrust policy would
dictate that sellers be free to price their goods flexibly in response to
competitive pressures. In the Supreme Court's view, the maintenance
of such freedom to meet competition is essential if we are to avoid the
conclusion that Congress in the Robinson-Patman Act sought "to
abolish competition" and to undermine the very premises of the Sher-
man ActY
At the same time, the maintenance of competition among sellers may
have little relevance to the maintenance of competition among buyers.
Indeed the two may be in direct and open conflict. For while the right
to meet a competitor's price is essential to the survival of a seller,
such meeting of competition may also reflect the securing of substantial
price advantages by large buyers. In many ways the meeting com-
petition defense may actually operate to favor the big buyer over the
small buyer and to assure that the impact of the act will fall most
heavily on the small buyer. It is most often the large buyer whose
quantity buying and buying methods permit at least some sellers to
realize savings in cost. Even if only one seller realizes such savings
entitling it to charge a lower price to a particularly large buyer, the
meeting competition defense permits all other competing sellers to
" Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attontey General's Report.
104 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 235-36 (1955).
" EDWARDS 580.
' Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951).
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meet that lower price regardless of whether they can provide cost
justification.
Similarly, a large buyer can frequently buy the entire output of a
single seller-and this frequently does occur in the food industry. The
price charged by a seller in such a case is not limited in any way by
the restrictions of the Robinson-Patman Act. Again, all other sellers
may meet this price even if it does not reflect any savings in cost.
Finally, it is the large buyer who can frequently exert sufficient pres-
sure to induce somebody to give him a price concession. Other sellers
may respond on an industry-wide basis to meet such a concession.
Thereafter it may be impossible to determine which of the sellers was
the initiator and which were merely responding defensively."
In each of these situations, regardless of whether the sellers' lower
prices are good faith responses to a competitor's price and regardless
of whether such responses are essential to the maintenance of com-
petition at the seller level, competition at the buyer level may be very
seriously impaired. Dissatisfaction with these results has led to un-
successful legislative efforts to revise the meeting competition defense
so as to qualify its use in those cases where there is a substantial im-
pairment of competition in the traditionally broader Clayton Act
sense-that is, where the effect is substantially to lessen competition or
to tend to create a monopoly5 2
This conflict between the objectives of maintaining competition at
the seller level and at the buyer level may explain the evolution of a
number of doctrines which have, in their turn, significantly impaired
the usefulness of the meeting competition defense as a means for pro-
tecting competition at the seller level. If the meeting competition de-
fense is to have any practical meaning, it must be given a flexible inter-
pretation enabling sellers to act promptly in response to the exigencies
of competition. Sensitivity to the realities of everyday commercial life,
not rigid standards imposing unrealistic and impossible duties of in-
quiry and prediction on businessmen, is essential if the defense is to
have any substance. Pragmatism, not strict logic, must be the keynote
to interpretation. The standard of "good faith" must be "simply the
" See Callaway Mills Co., No. 7634, FTC, Feb. 10, 1964 (dissenting opinion),
rcv'd, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
r2 See, e.g., S. 11, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The bills introduced would have
made the meeting competition defense an absolute one in those cases where a dis-
crimination merely tended to "injure, destroy, or prevent competition with" the
buyer's competitors, but would have permitted the Commission to disregard the meet-
ing competition defense where the effect of the price discriminations was "substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." See generally RoWE 256-64.
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standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he
believes is a situation of competitive necessity. 53
Instead, the act has very often been read to impose unreasonable
burdens upon businessmen. Such interpretations appear to some to
reflect a basic hostility towards the good faith defense. Despite earlier
indications that the Commission might be adopting a more flexible ap-
proach, recent actions indicate that the 2(b) defense still does not
perform its legitimate role.
The first obstacle to effective use of the defense is the doctrine that
a seller is not in good faith if he meets a price which he knows, or has
reason to believe, is unlawful. Precisely what burden does this impose
upon the seller? Where the defense is invoked, must complaint counsel
come forward and show circumstances which would have indicated to
a reasonable seller that the price he was being asked to meet was
unlawful? Or does the burden rest upon the seller invoking the defense
to establish that he had reason to believe that the price he was meeting
was lawful? Or must he merely show that there were not circum-
stances which would have reasonably led him to believe that the price
he was meeting was unlawful? Surely, any standard which is con-
structed should give recognition to the fact that a businessman who
has no access to his competitor's records can hardly be expected in the
ordinary case to be capable of establishing in advance, and midst the
hurly-burly of the marketplace, the lawfulness of his competitor's
prices, a question which can usually be determined only after extensive
inquiry conducted long after the event. As I have said elsewhere: 4
The law should not be construed as forcing a seller to compete at his
peril. A "sales manager who is trying to compete.., is not, of course,
required to become a detective or a judge." A businessman who must
operate in the pressures of the marketplace cannot be expected to conduct
a survey into his competitor's costs or to prophesy whether the competi-
tor's lower price will later be held unlawful.
Moreover, a serious question has been raised as to whether there
should be rigid and absolute insistence that the price met must be a
lawful one. Commissioner MacIntyre has said that "the right of self-
defense long recognized is available only to counteract wrongful and
unlawful conduct.... This inconsistency between recognized right of
self-defense and what has been provided in the way of self-defense
Continental Baking Co., No. 7630, FTC, Dec. 31, 1963.
" Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 1134, 1176 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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under the 'good faith proviso' is left unexplained by the [Supreme]
Court and the Commission.""
A second obstacle to the meaningful use of the good faith defense
is the dogma that a seller must establish that he was meeting a particu-
lar price in a specific competitive situation and that he cannot meet
so-called pricing systems or general price levels. It is true that the
literal language of the statute permits the defense only to meet the
"equally low price of a competitor." However, the courts have tradi-
tionally given this language a common-sense reading. The Supreme
Court has pointed out that section 2 (b) "does not place an impossible
burden upon sellers,"5 and the First Circuit, in reversing a Commis-
sion holding that a seller must affirmatively show that he knew the
exact prices of competitors and the names of the competitors who bid
the price that he was meeting, recently said: 7
We may not be in as intimate touch with the ways of commerce as the
Commission, but we would be naive indeed if we believed that buyers
would have any great solicitude for the welfare of their commercial
antagonists, sellers. The seller wants the highest price he can get and
the buyer wants to buy as cheaply as he can, and to achieve their
antagonistic ends neither expects the other, or can be expected, to lay
all his cards face up on the table. Battle of wits is the rule. Haggling
has ever been the way of the market place. The Commission's require-
ment is unrealistic.
The recent Callaway Mills decision', in the Fifth Circuit, rejecting the
Commission's holding that meeting a competitor's discount schedule
does not satisfy the good faith defense, is the latest chapter in this
story.
Yet, despite the repeated efforts of the courts to inject a note of
realism into the interpretation of the meeting competition defense, the
administration of the law appears to remain unaffected. How, for
example, can one harmonize with Forster and Callaway Mills the view
that "general" testimony that price discriminations were made to meet
competition, "without documentation or specific evidence," is never
sufficient to support a good faith defense, and that to establish the
defense the respondent must show that he "used reasonable diligence
' Continental Baking Co., No. 7630, FTC, Dec. 31, 1963, at 4 (separate opinion of
Commissioner Maclntyre).
'FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1964).t3 Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
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in verifying the existence of a lower price to a competitor"? 9 How
does one verify a competitor's price? Suppose that a buyer tells his
supplier that he must grant him a six percent discount off list price or
lose his business to a competitor. Under the prevailing view, the seller
presumably cannot accept the buyer's statement at face value, even
though its obvious purport is that a six per cent discount is necessary to
meet the competitor's price. Would you counsel your client to call his
competitor, ask him what price he is charging, and then charge exactly
the same price? Or would you be afraid that your advice might lead
your client straight to an indictment for illegal price fixing? And just
what would be happening to the customer while your client is wander-
ing about making diligent efforts to verify the competitor's price which
he has been told either to meet or "get out"?
Suppose too that your client's competitor publishes a new volume
discount schedule. Is your client within the good faith defense if,
being generally aware that his list prices are similar to his competitor's,
he simply adopts the new discount schedule published by his compe-
titor? Or is he meeting a "pricing system"? If so, how else can he
practically meet his competitor's new low prices?
Should not "price" in the meeting competition defense receive a
flexible interpretation enabling a seller to meet the necessities of com-
petition? The Commission has held, for example, that where a seller's
product ordinarily commands a higher price in the marketplace be-
cause of consumer preferences, he is beating, not meeting, competition
when he lowers his price to equal that of his competitor's product,
traditionally selling at a lower price."0 Should not a similar principle
apply in the converse situation: Where a seller finds that buyers have
a preference for a competitor's product resting on other factors than
price alone, should he not be permitted to charge a competitive price,
one capable of overcoming such consumer preferences, even if it means
"beating" his competitor's price?
Finally, the good faith defense has been seriously restricted by the
doctrine that it can only be used "defensively" to retain old customers
rather than "aggressively" to obtain a new customer or in anticipation
of pricing practices of a competitor. Aside from the fact that the dis-
' Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, No. 7225, FTC, July 28, 1966; see also National Dairy
Prods. Corp., No. 7018, FTC, July 28, 1966.
'Callaway Mills Co., No. 7634, FTC, Feb. 10, 1964; American Oil Co., 60
F.T.C. 1786, 1810-11 (1962) ; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 302 (1957) ; see
FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 646-47, 657-58 (1966).
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tinction is practically unworkable, 61 it does not make economic sense.
How can it conceivably be consistent with a competitive philosophy
that a seller is prohibited from competing in price with a rival in
order to obtain new customers?62 This doctrine has already been
rejected by one court.6" Nevertheless, the Commission apparently con-
tinues to adhere to it.
A real, and fundamental, conflict in public policy does exist with
respect to the meeting competition defense. It cannot be resolved by
reading unreasonable and inflexible standards into the defense. For
the consequence is to deny the defense in situations where it should
clearly be available as a means of protecting competition at the seller
level. The task is to determine the relative values which we are to
assign to the protection of competition at the seller level and to the
protection of competition at the buyer level, and to strike an appro-
priate balance. Professor Edwards has stated the issue very clearly: 4
The policy of the law should be to reconcile so far as possible two
objectives: freedom for businessmen to price their goods flexibly in
response to the varying pressures of the market, and curbs on exercise
of that freedom in ways that thwart the objectives of the statute as to
competition and competitive opportunity. One may describe the recon-
ciliation in different ways by placing primary emphasis on the one
objective or the other. Thus, one may say that freedom of business price
policy should be limited only for clear reason, or that the law should
protect the public against the evils of price discrimination in a way that
leaves as much freedom as possible. Under either formulation, what
must be sought is a balance that reconciles the liberty of the enterprise
with the continuance of liberty in the relationships among their enter-
prises and among consumers.
It is important that the question be brought out into the open and that
a rational and considered choice be made.
VI. SECTION 2 (c)
No provision of the Robinson-Patman Act has been subjected to
more attack than section 2(c)-the so-called brokerage section. En-
G Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, CCH SYmPosilUi: BusINEss PRAcTicEs
UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 158, 167 (1951); Rowe, Price Discrimination,
Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patinan, 60 YALE L.J. 929,
970 (1951).
79 HARV. L. REv. 921, 924-25 (1966) (emphasis in original):
How could any antitrust law be interpreted to mean that you can meet com-
petition to hold an existing customer, but not to get new ones? Is that at all
consistent ... with the Sherman Act which makes it a per se offense to allocate
customers or to attempt to monopolize your own customers?
c' Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
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forcement of section 2 (c) has been criticized not only as inconsistent
with broad antitrust policies but as irrelevant even to the objectives of
a price discrimination law. At one time, enforcement of the Robinson-
Patman Act meant principally enforcement of section 2(c). Those
days appear to be over." And recent decisions by the Commission
and the courts indicate that ancient dogmas are beginning to wither.6
This may eliminate some of the more astonishing absurdities which
were involved in earlier enforcement activities, and make the section
a less inviting vehicle for an easy route to a cease and desist order.
Nevertheless, old and cherished doctrines die hard. 7 Anomalies still
occur, at least in treble damage actions." There always exists the
possibility that 2(c) may once again play a prominent role in Com-
mission enforcement policy; 69 at all events, serious questions are raised
about the utility or desirability of an absolute prohibition of this kind
in the scheme of a price discrimination law.
Section 2(c) prohibits the payment of brokerage, or allowances
"in lieu of brokerage," to the buyer or its agent "except for services
rendered." The section was aimed at specific practices which existed
in the food retailing industry at the time the act was passed. In order
to avoid the prohibition on price concessions in section 2 of the original
Clayton Act, large chain buyers used a number of devices for obtaining
disguised indirect price concessions. One of these was to set up a
dummy broker who in fact performed no brokerage services but was
merely an agent of the buyer. The buyer would then demand that the
seller pay "brokerage" to the dummy. In other circumstances the
chain would simply demand that the seller pay it an allowance "in
lieu of brokerage" on the pretext that it has saved the seller part or
all of its brokerage costs. Again, no brokerage services would be
SEDWARDS 580.
'RowE, The Robinson-Patman Act-7hirty Years 7hereafter, 30 ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTiON REP. 9, 14 (1966).
"Compare FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 173 (1960), and Central
Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 317 F2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963), and Thomasville
Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962), and Edward Joseph Hruby, 61 FTC
1437 (1962), with Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945),
and FTC v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1945), and 'Modern Mkt. Serv, Inc. v.
FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945), and Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F2d 687
(2d Cir. 1938).
' See Flotill Prods., Inc., No. 7226, FTC, June 26, 1964, rev'd on other gronds,
Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1966).
"Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
"Recently at a public hearing held before the Commission relating to the
competitive effects of drop-shipping in the automotive parts replacement market, a
proposal was made by one industry group that the Commission enter a new stage of
Robinson-Patman enforcement in that industry via section 2 (c).
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performed, and very often the allowance to the buyer would come out
of the pocket of a legitimate broker who, in such transactions, would
receive no brokerage or would be required to share his brokerage with
the buyer.7 0
The purpose of the brokerage section was to force these disguised
transactions out into the open by imposing upon them an absolute pro-
hibition. With respect to these practices, the act quickly had the de-
sired effect. Very soon after its passage, chains changed their methods
of doing business in an effort to conform to the provisions of section
2(c).
In fact, the history of enforcement under 2 (c) has had very little
relation to the practices which it was designed to condemn. It has been
frequently noted that the main impact of 2(c) enforcement was not
upon large buyers at all; it was felt rather by small sellers and buyers.
In one series of cases it was used to cripple the activities of voluntary
and cooperative buying groups designed to enable small buyers to
compete with the large chains.71 Ultimately, the main function of the
section was to protect a single type of middleman, the "independent
broker," against competition from other channels of distribution. 2
The Commission became an arbiter, determining which methods of
transacting business were "legitimate" according to a standard which
bore no relationship to their impact on competition.
This distortion of section 2(c) came about through the early de-
vitalization of the exception provided for cases in which legitimate
services were rendered, as well as through the erection of the dogmas
that a "true broker" cannot serve two masters and that a buyer's
agent could not perform legitimate services for the seller for which he
was entitled to compensation.73 In the buying group cases the volun-
tary wholesaler performed an important function in promoting the
seller's private label goods to the members of the voluntary group.
Yet, these services were ignored. In the garment industry, distributors
" See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168-69 (1960) ; Flotill Prods.,
Inc., No. 7226, FTC, June 26, 1964 (dissenting opinion), rev'd w; other grounds,
Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1966); F.T.C., Final Report on
the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doe. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63 (1935);
RowE 332-37.
7 Independent Grocers Alliance Distribution Co. v. FTC, 203 F2d 941 (7th Cir.
1953) ; Modern Mkt. Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
"A7ORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 190.
"See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945);
Modern Mkt. Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Biddle Purchasing
Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938).
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in various parts of the country, in order to maintain contact and keep
in close touch with fashion and style changes at the center of the
garment trade in New York City, find it necessary to maintain ar-
rangements with so-called resident buyers whose offices are located in
New York. These resident buyers perform a valuable function both
for the seller and the buyer, bringing them together. In some in-
stances the fee of the resident buyer is paid by the distributor, and in
others by the seller. The resident buyer is in no sense a dummy; his
activities bear no relationship to the activities of the chains which
brought about passage of section 2 (c) ; he in fact performs a valuable
marketing and distribution function in the garment industry. There
is no reason to believe that payment to the resident buyer by the seller
discriminates in favor of large buyers or in fact results in any dis-
crimination at all. There is certainly no evidence that the practice is
in any way harmful to competition in the garment industry. Yet, the
practice of payment by the seller has been held to be a violation of
section 2 (c)."4
Similarly absurd results occurred in the Commission's cases against
"buying brokers"-concededly legitimate and independent brokers
who, in acting as intermediaries between small suppliers and small
wholesalers, bought for their own account and took title to the goods.
Ignoring the realities of the situation, the Commission held that such
brokers, having taken title to the goods, were themselves the buyers
and in receiving "brokerage" had literally violated section 2(c) .1
In summarizing the effects of these cases, Professor Edwards con-
cluded that: 6
Viewed as a whole, the brokerage cases appear to include many that
did not express the central purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act and
that had effects partly inconsistent with those purposes.... Several...
cases have forced voluntary chains and cooperatives to look for their
income to other sources than sales commissions and to rely for their
usefulness on service functions or co-operative buying rather than on an
ambiguous agency relationship to buyers and sellers. This group of
cases has done something to weaken the voluntary organizations in their
struggle against the corporate chains. Two cases have prevented buyers
from continuing to obtain market information at a discount, apparently
with no other significant effect. In reducing the fluidity of the activities
of buying brokers, several cases have substantially impaired the com-
" FTC v. Herzog, 150 F2d 450 (2d Cir. 1945).
Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945).
"EDWARDS 150-51.
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petitive strength of small wholesalers who are dependent on ... [less-
than-carload lot] purchases and of the brokers who serve them, and
probably have also weakened smaller producers in their competition
with large producers.
Anomalous results, indeed, for a piece of antitrust legislation whose
avowed aim is to protect the small businessman!
As I have already pointed out, the tide may have turned, and
greater recognition seems to be accorded the view that a middleman
rendering legitimate distribution services is entitled to compensation
for those services, and that he should not be deprived of the com-
pensation he has earned by labeling it "brokerage" or a payment "in
lieu of brokerage. 7 Is it not time that we also reexamined the view
that a buyer, even a large chain buyer, who in fact legitimately
reduces the seller's brokerage costs through his methods of buying is
not, as has been previously held, receiving an illegal brokerage pay-
ment when the price to him is reduced accordingly, 78 but is in fact
receiving a legitimate reduction based on a cost saving to whose benefit
both he and the ultimate consumer are entitled? Is it not time to
re-examine section 2 (c), and the proper function which a "phony bro-
kerage" prohibition serves in the scheme of a price discrimination law?
VII. SECTION 2(d)
Section 2 (d) of the act also raises critical questions of public policy,
especially because of the increased enforcement activity under that
section in the last few years. That section prohibits a supplier from
granting advertising and promotional allowances unless such allow-
ances are made available on proportionally equal terms to all pur-
chasers competing in the resale of its products. Like section 2 (c), it is
a per se statute for which no proof of injury to competition is required
and no cost-justification defense is available. Unlike 2 (c), however,
the courts, over the opposition of the Commission, have read the
meeting competition defense into section 2 (d). However, the adapta-
tion of that defense to the context of promotional allowances has yet
to be fully explored.79
There are a number of questions of current importance under sec-
I FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960); Central Retailer-Owned
Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC,
306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962); Edward Joseph Hruby, 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
'; Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939).
' See Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1961), appeal following remand, TADE REG. RE'. (1965
Trade Cas.) 1 71491 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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tion 2(d), such as whether a supplier who makes advertising allow-
ances available to large direct buying retailer customers must also
make them available to its wholesale customers selling to retailers in
competition with the direct buying retailers,80 or, as I have suggested,
to the retailer customers of such wholesalers.8 ' These questions must
be examined in the context of the fundamental purpose of 2(d) and
the enforcement policy which has evolved under it.
The background of this section is similar to that of section 2 (c).
Section 2(d) had its origin in the view that many promotional and
advertising allowances were forms for disguising price rebates. By
making the prohibitions of 2 (d) absolute, it was hoped to force such
disguised rebates out into the open as price concessions where they
could be dealt with under the price discrimination sections.8 2 How-
ever, to treat all promotional allowances as disguised price rebates
obviously conflicts with commercial realities. Cooperative advertising
between supplier and distributor is an important and legitimate pro-
motional device. Allowances which are part of such a program are
certainly not disguised rebates. They are payments in compensation
for legitimate and earned promotional services.
This fact raises two important questions. The first goes to the
very heart of section 2 (d) as enacted. Should a supplier be prevented
from making maximum effective use of a restricted advertising budget
through a selective cooperative advertising program, even where such
a program in no way injures the competitive process? Take for
example the case of a small dress manufacturer who has a small ad-
vertising budget. If he wishes to engage in a cooperative promotional
program, the law requires him to make available any allowances on
proportionally equal terms to all his customers. If it were not for
section 2(d), a manufacturer in such circumstances would choose
those retail outlets with the greatest prestige and confine his adver-
tising to them. Obviously, an important part of the value of coopera-
tive advertising to the manufacturer lies in the desirability of linking
one's product with the name of a well-known and reputable retailer.
To require him to give advertising allowances to retailers who cannot
effectively promote his product, or, worse yet, to those whose public
image he positively does not want to link himself with, is to require
0 See Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting the Com-
mission's position).
"See Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 7492, FTC, March 29, 1963 (dissenting opinion).
" Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 360 U.S. 55, 68-70 (1959).
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him to allocate his advertising resources irrationally and uneconomic-
ally. Indeed, it also puts him at a disadvantage with his more power-
ful and larger competitors who may find that because of their superior
advertising resources they need not engage in any cooperative adver-
tising program. The rigid requirements of section 2(d), as currently
administered, thus raise serious questions of public policy. Once again,
Professor Edwards has put the issue clearly:83
The general policy of the law in a free private-enterprise system is to
leave buyers free to choose their sources of supply, to buy as much as
they want from these sources in such proportions as they wish, and to
pay the market value of what they buy. The application of these prin-
ciples to purchasers of advertising would suggest that it is inappropriate
to require a buyer of advertising service to buy it from all his customers
if he buys it from any and to buy it from them in stated proportions to
which proportionate values are arbitrarily assigned. One might, with
similar logic, require a steel manufacturer to buy railway transportation
service from every railroad in proportion, not to his need for service
from each, but to the amount of his steel products purchased by each.
I do not suggest that this question of public policy raised by section
2(d) is simple or easily resolved. If a manufacturer may budget his
cooperative advertising program so as to select those purchasers with
the greatest prestige, the result may be to confer substantial competi-
tive advantages on large buyers. But, at the present time, section 2 (d)
does not require any assessment of competitive impact. It seems to
me, therefore, that the issue is drawn as to whether so serious an inter-
ference with a supplier's discretion in allocating his advertising re-
sources is justified, in the absence of any inquiry whatsoever as to
effect on competition. The utility of a per se approach in this area
remains highly doubtful, at the very least.
Current enforcement policy under section 2 (d) also raises a second
and somewhat related question. In determining whether a program
of promotional allowances is "available" on proportionally equal terms,
the Commission requires that a program be functionally available to
all customers. Some customers, because of the low volume of their
purchases, might be entitled to allowances so small that they could not
be used for certain advertising media, such as newspaper advertising.
The Commission has taken an increasingly rigid attitude in this regard,
insisting that a supplier, in order to meet the "availability" require-
ments, must offer his customers alternative promotional programs
I EDxvAaDS 158-59.
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which would be economically and functionally feasible for all cus-
tomers.84 This means that not only is a supplier not free to select the
retailers with whom he will engage in cooperative advertising, but he
is not free to choose the advertising media which have value to him.
Indeed, as currently interpreted, 2(d) may require the payment of
allowances for "promotional" services which are actually useless to the
supplier, and, from the standpoint of selling his product, entirely
worthless. I have recently pointed out that this approach is not re-
quired by the language, policy, or legislative history of section 2 (d).11
And, indeed, by requiring a misallocation of economic resources for
wasteful or useless advertising, present enforcement policy may bring
section 2 (d) into direct conflict with the objectives of antitrust policy.
This issue, too, requires thorough reappraisal.
VIII. ORIENTATION OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Perhaps the most critical question-one whose solution may obviate
some of the problems that have been mentioned here-is how to re-
orient enforcement policy so as to focus on the central evil at which
the Robinson-Patman Act was aimed, i.e., the misuse of large buying
power. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed "to curb and prohibit
all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences
over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power."8 In
the words of its principal draftsman, "buying power is the source of the
evil. The seller is merely an innocent victim compelled usually in
self-defense to grant the concessions demanded. ' ' 7 From its inception,
however, enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act has been directed
almost entirely against the seller.
In part, this derives from the failure of the original draftsmen who,
although concerned mainly with buying power, constructed the act
to emphasize prohibitions on discrimination by the seller. The heart
of the act is in section 2(a). Even section 2(f) which is directed at
the buyer, makes his liability turn upon whether the seller has violated
section 2 (a). Section 2 (d) is perhaps the best illustration of the di-
vergence between the provisions of the statute and its underlying pur-
pose to curb the abuse of concentrated buying power. Although
enacted to prevent big buyers from obtaining price rebates disguised
House of Lords, Inc., No. 8631, FTC, Jan. 18, 1966.
' House of Lords, Inc., supra note 84, at 10 (dissenting opinion).
" FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
' Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 10, pt. 1, at 31 (1935), quoted in Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382, at 420 (1960).
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as promotional allowances, it is in terms directed solely at the seller,
saying nothing whatsoever about the buyer.
The Commission's efforts to remedy the oversight in section 2(d)
may be especially instructive for any refashioning of the price dis-
crimination law. In many instances suppliers are confronted with a
uniform demand from a large chain buyer for discriminatory promo-
tional allowances. Where such a demand is made of each of his com-
petitors, and the business of the chain is vital for his survival, the
supplier usually has no choice but to go along. But since, in such cir-
cumstances, each supplier may be meeting competition in good faith,
he may have a complete defense to a section 2 (d) charge. The Com-
mission, recognizing both this dilemma and the fundamental objective
of the Robinson-Patman Act to curb the abuse of large buying power,
announced that the "enforcement policy best calculated to achieve the
ends contemplated by Congress"" was one directed at the buyer in-
ducing the discriminatory promotional allowances, through a proceed-
ing under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.89
A proceeding under section 5 against the large and powerful buyer
may not only remove the inequity of proceeding against the weak
seller who is the buyer's victim. It may also eliminate the paradoxes
generated by the meeting competition defense which were discussed
earlier. Section 2 (b), of course, recognizes a seller's legitimate interest
in being free to take appropriate defensive action in a situation of
competitive necessity. But where the Commission proceeds under
section 5 against a buyer who, by the exercise of coercive power, is the
very source of the competitive necessity to which each seller must
respond. is it not anomalous to permit the buyer to invoke the shelter
of the seller's good faith defense? And if enforcement of the act were
primarily directed at the buyer, rather than the seller, would not that
eliminate the policy tensions reflected in existing controversy over the
meeting competition defense, namely, whether competition at one level
should be protected at the cost of impairing it on another level?
Finally, would not a section 5 approach directed at the abuse of buying
power permit a more precise differentiation of those practices which
impair competition from those which reflect the legitimate exercise of
bargaining pressure upon which a competitive economy thrives?
To be sure, these questions are easier to ask than to answer. Legal
3 oog Indus. v. FTC, 335 U.S. 411, 413 (1958).
" Mfax Factor & Co., No. 7717, FTC, July 22, 1964; Shulton, Inc., No. 7721, FTC,
July 22, 1964.
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rules unduly restricting buyers in exerting pressure for lower prices,
especially where such lower prices are justified by efficiencies and
economies in methods of buying, would harm competition. The Su-
preme Court has pointed out the importance of establishing standards
which reconcile the objectives of section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman
Act with broader antitrust policies. But the appropriate line is hard
to draw. Recently the Commission has tried to revivify section 2(f);
in my view, the impact of the actions it has taken has been felt largely
in areas outside the central concerns of the act. The great majority of
recent 2 (f) cases have attacked the buying practices of relatively small
jobbers who have banded together to form buying groups in the auto-
mobile repair parts after-market, possibly as a defensive measure
against the competition of powerful chain buyers or the competition of
the auto manufacturers themselves." The jobbers involved in these
cases are hardly the type of large buyers at whom section 2(f) was
originally directed.
IX. CONCLUSION
The problems I have discussed do not exhaust the areas in which
the Robinson-Patman Act and its administration may come in conflict
with broader antitrust policy. But it should be clear, I believe, that
reexamination of the law is urgently needed. In no field of the law
more than in antitrust is it essential that the adequacy of existing
rules and procedures be periodically reviewed. And no segment of our
antitrust laws is more in need of such reappraisal than the Robinson-
Patman Act. A dynamic, competitive economy, as Mr. Justice Fortas
has recently reminded us, cannot afford a mechanical or sterile anti-
trust jurisprudence: 92
[A] ntitrust.. . is too important to be allowed to function as formula.
Its effects upon our life are too profound for us to permit it to operate
as mere ritual, without analysis of its impact, without fundamental
reappraisal of its effect upon changing institutions, practices and prob-
lems, and without direction. There must be more to the administration
of antitrust than a handbook on "how to do it"....
' Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
' Alhambra Motor Parts, No. 6889, FTC, Dec. 17, 1965 (appeal pending in the
Ninth Circuit); National Parts Warehouse, No. 8039, FTC, Dec. 16, 1963, aff'd
sub non. General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Mid-
South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838(1961); American Motor Specialties, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).91230 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 131, 134-35 (1966).
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[O]ne would hope that, by now, it would be possible really to survey
the past, to appraise the present and to consider the future in terms of
the effect of antitrust policies, theories and practices as they are and as
they might be modified....
I know that fear is one of the factors inhibiting economic and policy
diagnosis and prognosis of antitrust. Everybody is afraid he will be
worse off if the realities of antitrust are confronted.... [B]ut, after all,
democracy is the art of living dangerously, and antitrust is exceedingly
democratic. And as I see the vast changes that have taken place in
production, distribution and consumption-and the even greater changes
that are imminent-I become more convinced than ever that we cannot
providently continue to play the game of antitrust-in-the-dark. I hope
that if and when light is brought to bear upon the economic and social
effects of antitrust, it will disclose that there is no reason to abandon
or weaken the fundamental policy of insisting on competition. I should
hope, indeed, that it would lead to reexamination of our theory of
competition and to the illumination of methods and standards by which
that theory can be more effectively-and constructively-applied.
It is in this constructive spirit that a review and reappraisal of the
Robinson-Patman Act and its administration should be undertaken.

